
AUTHORS:
Damian Chalmers, Professor of European Law at the London School
of Economics and Political Science.
Gareth Davies, Professor of European Law at the Department
of International Law, VU University, Amsterdam.
Giorgio Monti, Reader in Law at the London School of Economics
and Political Science.
DATE PUBLISHED:
July 2010
AVAILABILITY:
In stock
FORMAT: Paperback
ISBN: 9780521121514
PAGES: 1.116
$67.00
9. Governance
9.6 Transparency
(ii) Exceptions to the right to access to
information
Most litigation has not focused on the extent of the right of access to information but rather the exceptions to this right, which allow access to be refused. These are set out in article 4 of Regulation 1049/2001/EC. On its face, it may seem an arcane business, to ponder over and again the meaning of this provision. Yet, it has proved central as these exceptions are for- mulated in such a way as to cover whole fields of Union governmental or legislative activity. Debates about the remit of article 4 raise questions as to whether we can be denied access to knowledge about the way in which an entire field of EU law or politics is being conducted. In this regard, the rate of refusal is quite high, with 13.99 per cent of requests for information being refused in 2008, with a further 3.33 per cent only being given partial access.[98]
Article 4
1. The institutions
shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection
of:
(a) the public interest as regards:
- public security,
- defence and military matters,
- international relations,
- the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community
or a Member State;
(b) privacy and
the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation
regarding the protection of personal data.
2. The
institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine
the protection of:
- commercial interests of a natural or legal
person, including intellectual property,
- court proceedings and legal advice,
- the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits,
unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
3. which relates to a matter where the decision
has not been taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document
would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there
is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
Access to a document containing opinions for internal use
as part of deliberations and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned
shall be refused even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document
would seriously undermine the institution’s decision-making process, unless there
is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
4. As regards third-party
documents, the institution shall consult the third party with a view to assessing
whether an exception in paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless it is clear that
the document shall or shall not be disclosed.
5. A Member State
may request the institution not to disclose a document originating from that Member
State without its prior agreement.
6. If only parts of the requested document are covered
by any of the exceptions, the remaining parts of the document shall be released.
There has been extensive
case law on these exceptions, and only some of the more salient issues will be addressed
here.[99]
The starting point of the Union courts is that, as the public right of access to
the documents is connected with the democratic nature of the EU institutions, the
Regulation intends to give the public the widest access. The exceptions must therefore
be interpreted and applied strictly.[100]
This statement is, however, little more than rhetorical, particularly as the exceptions
are grouped into three categories.
• The first category set out in article 4(1)
of the Regulation is mandatory. It requires the insti- tution to refuse access to
the document if it falls within that category. The proposed amend- ments to the
Regulation would create one further exception here relating to the public inter-
est as regards the ‘the environment, such as breeding sites of rare species’.[101]
It deletes the privacy exception set out in the current Regulation, replacing it
with a new exception which requires EU institutions only to disclose personal data
in accordance with EU legislation on data protection.[102]
• The second exception set out in article 4(2)
and (3) gives the EU institutions a discretion to grant access to a document if,
notwithstanding that it falls within one of the categories, there is an overriding
public interest. This category has been extended by the proposed amendments to include
arbitration and dispute settlement proceedings and the objectivity and impartiality
of selection procedures.
• The
third exception, in article 4(5), relates to documents originating from a Member
State. In such instances, there is a requirement of prior agreement.
The
Regulation, thus, sets out three tests of review. This is not uncontroversial, as
it is hard to see why an overriding public interest can never exist in relation
to the first or the third category. There may, for example, be ‘security’ documents
or national documents whose disclosure makes the decision-maker uncomfortable, but
which are nevertheless essential for public debate.
With
regard to the mandatory exceptions, the courts apply a test of marginal review.
That is to say that they accept that the issue will often be sensitive and the institution
in question must have discretion over the matter. The courts will thus not substitute
their judgement for that of the institution but confine themselves to seeing whether
accurate reasons have been given for the refusal and whether there has been a manifest
error of assessment. A recent example is WWF European Policy Programme. The WWF,
an environmental NGO, asked for documents concerning international trade negotiations
taking place within the World Trade Organization. These documents set out other
states’ positions as well as that of the Union in the negotiations, and also the
minutes of the meetings. The Council refused to disclose under article 4(1)(a),
arguing that this undermined the Union’s commercial interests and would be prejudicial
to its relations with other states.
Case T-264/04 WWF European Policy Programme
v Council [2007] ECR II-911
39. . . . the rule is that the public is to have
access to the documents of the institutions and refusal of access is the exception
to that rule. Consequently, the provisions sanctioning a refusal must be construed
and applied strictly so as not to defeat the application of the rule. Moreover,
an institution is obliged to consider in respect of each document to which access
is sought whether, in the light of the information available to that institution,
disclosure of the document is in fact likely to undermine one of the public interests
protected by the exceptions which permit refusal of access. In order for those exceptions
to be applicable, the risk of the public interest being undermined must therefore
be reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical . . .
40. It is also apparent from the case law that
the institutions enjoy a wide discretion when considering whether access to a document
may undermine the public interest and, consequently, that the Court’s review of
the legality of the institutions’ decisions refusing access to documents on the
basis of the mandatory exceptions relating to the public interest must be limited
to verifying whether the procedural rules and the duty to state reasons have been
complied with, the facts have been accurately stated, and whether there has been
a manifest error of assessment of the facts or a misuse of powers . . .
41. As to whether there was a manifest error
of assessment of the facts, as the applicant essentially submits is the case, it
must be noted that the Council refused to grant access to the note so as not to
risk upsetting the negotiations that were taking place at that time in a sensitive
context, which was characterised by resistance on the part of both the developing
and the developed countries and the difficulty in reaching an agreement, as illustrated
by the breakdown of negotiations at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun in
September 2003. Thus, in considering that disclosure of that note could have undermined
relations with the third countries which are referred to in the note and the room
for negotiation needed by the Community and its Member States to bring those negotiations
to a conclusion, the Council did not commit a manifest error of assessment and was
right to consider that disclosure of the note would have entailed the risk of undermining
the public interest as regards international relations and the Community’s financial,
monetary and economic policy, which was reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.
In this
instance, the review was quite thin. The General Court defers to the Council’s assessment
in paragraph 41 that providing the information will upset negotiation. However,
it has not been consistent and, in some instances, the review of whether there has
been a manifest error of assessment will be quite exacting. In Kuijer, a university
lecturer challenged a decision by the Council to refuse him access to human rights
reports on a number of countries that had been prepared for CIREA, an EU body that
compiled documentation and exchanged information on asylum.[103] As some of these were quite damning, the Council refused on the grounds that
this would damage relations with these countries. The General Court did not agree
with this characterisation and overturned the Council’s decision. It held that refusal
had to be made by reference to the specific content and context of each human rights
report. These reports contained general information on the protection of human rights
which had already been made public and did not involve any politically sensitive
appraisal of the state by the Council itself. The Court held, therefore, that neither
the content nor the nature of the reports justified a refusal to grant access.
In the case of the discretionary category
in article 4(2) and (3) of the Regulation, EU institutions must allow access to
a document if, notwithstanding that it falls within one of these categories, there
is an overriding public interest which justifies disclosure. The strongest example
of judicial review of this is Turco. Turco, an MEP, sought access to legal advice
the Council had received from its legal services on the proposed Directive laying
down minimum standards for the reception of applicants for asylum in Member States.
This was refused under the legal advice exception in article 4(2). The Council stated
that greater transparency alone was not an overriding public interest, and this
view was upheld by the General Court. Turco and the Swedish government appealed
to the Court of Justice, who upheld his appeal. Having found that the advice constituted
legal advice for the purposes of article 4(2), the Court went on to assess whether
there was an overriding public interest justifying disclosure.
Joined Cases
C-39/05 and C-52/05 Sweden and Turco v Council [2008] ECR I-4723
44. ... if the Council takes the view that disclosure
of a document would undermine the protection of legal advice as defined above, it
is incumbent on the Council to ascertain whether there is any overriding public
interest justifying disclosure despite the fact that its ability to seek legal advice
and receive frank, objective and comprehensive advice would thereby be undermined.
45. In that respect, it is for the Council to
balance the particular interest to be protected by non-disclosure of the document
concerned against, inter alia, the public interest in the document being made accessible
in the light of the advantages stemming, as noted in recital 2 of the preamble to
Regulation No. 1049/2001, from increased openness, in that this enables citizens
to participate more closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the
administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable
to the citizen in a democratic system.
46. Those considerations are clearly of particular
relevance where the Council is acting in its legislative capacity, as is apparent
from recital 6 of the preamble to Regulation No. 1049/2001, according to which wider
access must be granted to documents in precisely such cases. Openness in that respect
contributes to strengthening democracy by allowing citizens to scrutinize all the
information which has formed the basis of a legislative act. The possibility for
citizens to find out the considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition
for the effective exercise of their democratic rights.
47. It is also worth noting that, under [Article
16(8) TEU], the Council is required to define the cases in which it is to be regarded
as acting in its legislative capacity, with a view to allowing greater access to
documents in such cases. Similarly, Article 12(2) of Regulation No. 1049/2001 acknowledges
the specific nature of the legislative process by providing that documents drawn
up or received in the course of procedures for the adoption of acts which are legally
binding in or for the Member States should be made directly accessible.
The requirements
to be satisfied by the statement of reasons
48. The reasons for any decision of the Council
in respect of the exceptions set out in Article 4 of Regulation No. 1049/2001 must
be stated.
49. If the Council decides to refuse access to
a document which it has been asked to disclose, it must explain, first, how access
to that document could specifically and effectively undermine the interest protected
by an exception laid down in Article 4 of Regulation No. 1049/2001 relied on by
that institution and, secondly, in the situations referred to in Article 4(2) and
(3) of that Regulation, whether or not there is an overriding public interest that
might nevertheless justify disclosure of the document concerned.
50. It is, in principle, open to the Council
to base its decisions in that regard on general presumptions which apply to certain
categories of documents, as considerations of a generally similar kind are likely
to apply to requests for disclosure relating to documents of the same nature. However,
it is incumbent on the Council to establish in each case whether the general considerations
normally applicable to a particular type of document are in fact applicable to a
specific document which it has been asked to disclose.
The
judgment has been described as ‘spectacularly progressive’ by Adamski.[104] Certainly, it must be seen in its context which is that of an elected representative,
an MEP, asking about an instrument which raised strong human rights concerns. Yet,
the reasoning of the Court is general in nature and imposes significant constraints,
both substantively and procedurally. It suggests that where disclosure enables increased
participation in decision-making or greater accountability, then there is already
the makings of a case of an overriding public interest (paragraph 45). Yet, disclosure
will in many cases enable this. The procedural constraints are also quite precise.
It is not enough simply to mention a category and leave it at that. The institution
must explain specifically how the interest is undermined and whether or not there
is a public interest.
The
final exception is set out in article 4(5) and concerns documents originating from
a Member State. The traditional view is that the state concerned can veto any disclosure.[105] This changed in Sweden v Commission,[106] where Sweden appealed against the IFAW decision of the General Court to the
Court of Justice.[107] IFAW, a German NGO concerned with nature conservation, sought disclosure
of certain documents relating to the reclaiming of part of an estuary for the construction
of a runway that originated in Germany. The General Court held that if a Member
State requested, as Germany did here, that the document not be disclosed, then it
should not be disclosed. The Member State need not give reasons and the question
would be decided exclusively by the national law of that state. The Swedish government
appealed. The Court of Justice upheld the appeal. It held that to give a national
veto over documents originating from a Member State would be incompatible with
the purpose of the Regulation, which was to grant the widest possible access to
documents by allowing that right to be frustrated without any objective reason.
It would also introduce arbitrary distinctions whereby documents of a similar kind
held by the EU institutions would have different rules applying to them depending
on the origin of the document. The national veto applied, therefore, only if the
document fell within one of the categories set out in article 4(1)–(3) of the Regulation.
If an EU institution received a request for a national document, it was required
to open a dialogue with the Member State, which could only refuse disclosure if
it provided reasons why the document fell within one of the exceptions set out in
article 4(1)–(3).
The judgment indicates that the same substantive
principles concerning grounds for disclosure will apply whatever the provenance
of the document. In this way, it significantly expands the remit of the principle
in that whole fields of activity, in which the predominant players are Member States,
will now be subject to far greater scrutiny. It has led to a reaction, however.
The proposed amendments suggest a new article 5(2).
Article 5(2)
Where an application concerns a document
originating from a Member State, other than documents transmitted in the framework
of procedures leading to a legislative act or a non-legislative act of general application,
the authorities of that Member State shall be consulted. The institution holding
the document shall disclose it unless the Member State gives reasons for withholding
it, based on the exceptions referred to in Article 4 or on specific provisions in
its own legislation preventing disclosure of the document concerned. The institution
shall appreciate the adequacy of reasons given by the Member State insofar as they
are based on exceptions laid down in this Regulation.
Two qualifications to the Sweden v Commission judgment are thus added, both of which narrow the scope of access. First, the substance of the national reasons cannot be second-guessed by the EU institution. Even if it disagrees with them, it must respect them and not disclose the document if that is what is requested. It may be open to the applicant to challenge the Member State’s refusal but it can only do this before a national court, as it does not have standing to challenge Member States before the Court of Justice. Secondly, a further exception is added, namely exceptions allowed under national legislation. In this way, Member States can, if they so wish, restrict the access considerably by simply passing very draconian legislation.
FURTHER READING
D. Adamski, ‘How Wide
is the “Widest Possible”? Judicial Interpretation of the Exceptions to the Right
of Access to Official Documents’ (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 521
G. Davies,
‘Subsidiarity: The Wrong Idea, in the Wrong Place, at the Wrong Time’ (2006) 43
Common Market Law Review 63
C. Joerges, ‘Integration
Through De-legalisation?’ (2008) 33 European Law Review 291
C. Joerges, Y. Mény
and J. Weiler (eds.), Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission
White Paper on Governance (EUI and NYU, 2002), available at www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010601.html
C. Möllers, ‘European
Governance: Meaning and Value of a Concept’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 313
D. Obradovic and J.
Alonso, ‘Good Governance Requirements Concerning the Participation of Interes Groups in EU Consultations’
(2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1049
C. Radaelli, ‘Whither
Better Regulation for the Lisbon Agenda?’ (2007) 14 Journal of European Public Policy
190
J. Scott and D. Trubek,
‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European Union’ (2002)
8 European Law Journal 1
S. Smismans, ‘New
Governance: The Solution for Active European Citizenship, or the End of Citizenship?’
(2007) 13 Columbia Journal of European Law 595
J. Wiener,
‘Better Regulation in Europe’ (2006) 59 Current Legal Problems 447
[98] European Commission, above n. 85, 10.
[99] For more extensive treatment, see D. Adamski, ‘How Wide is the “Widest Possible”?
Judicial Interpretation of the Exceptions to the Right of Access to Official Documents’
(2009) 46 CMLRev. 521.
[100] See e.g. Case C-266/05 P Sison v Council [2007] ECR I-1233.
[101] European Commission Proposal, above n. 82, art. 4(1)(e).
[102] Ibid. art. 4(5).
[103] Case T-211/00 Kuijer v Council
[2002] ECR II-485.
[104] Adamski, above n. 99, 536.
[105] Case T-76/02 Messina v Commission [2003] ECR II-3203.
[106] Case C-64/05 P Sweden v Commission [2007] ECR I-11389.
[107] Case T-168/02 IFAW Internationaler Tierschutz-Fonds v Commission [2004] ECR
II-4135.